Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) derive entry thresholds (equilibrium numbers of firms) for local markets but do not investigate actual entry and exit flows. This paper investigates for thirteen Belgian retail and service industries whether markets with actual numbers of firms higher (lower) than the thresholds display exit (entry) in subsequent periods.
Introduction
Local markets are a key characterization of many service industries like plumbers, dentists, shoe stores, flower shops or restaurants. The (equilibrium) number of firms in these local service markets will be primarily dependent upon local demand. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) , in an oft-cited article, derive and estimate their so-called entry threshold, a measure of the market size required to support a given number of firms. The entry threshold is a zero-profit equilibrium level of demand (see also Schmalensee, 1992 and Sutton, 1991) which can be estimated using ordered probit analysis. Although the title of their article "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets" would suggest differently, their article does not consider actual entry into markets, nor exit. The current paper investigates whether markets that have less firms than the entry threshold show (net) entry of firms in the subsequent period and markets that have more firms than this threshold show (net) exit of firms.
Bresnahan and Reiss remark that more complete data on entry and exit (in local markets) is required to investigate the timing of entry and exit decisions. This is important to progress from an essentially static cross-sectional framework as developed by Bresnahan and Reiss towards a dynamic framework of entry and exit adjusting for market disequilibria. We have compiled a dataset for a range of carefully selected service industries in the 455 local regions (municipalities) of Belgium with less than 20,000 inhabitants. These data include number of firms, entry, exit and factors determining market size. The analysis suggests that the entry rate is much more flexible and more important in the adjustment process towards market equilibrium than the exit rate.
Entry thresholds from ordered probit analysis
This research deviates from earlier research, like Asplund and Sandin (1999) , Brenahan and Reiss and Serra et al. (1999) , to empirically examine local entry and exit rates. Number of entries, exits and incumbents are obtained for all 455 Belgian municipalities whose local market size (measured by population) is less than 20,000 (source: Belgian National Institute Summary statistics of the number of incumbents (in 1998), entrants and exits are presented in Table 1 . For entry and exit we provide data both for 1999 and for the three-year period 1999-
2001
. The average number of incumbents per municipality range from 1.64 for jewelry and 2.29 for shoe stores to 9.76 for fast food and 10.18 for restaurants. The average number of entrants and exits are both lowest for jewelry and both highest for fast food. Net entry is positive for five out of 13 industries (plumbing, painting, caterers, restaurants, real estate). In none of the retail industries we find a positive net entry. The fast food has the strongest growth in number of firms, with the butcheries and bakeries the strongest decline. Industries with relatively high (low) entry rates also have relatively high (low) exit rates. The distribution of municipalities in our sample according to population size is given in Figure 1 .
[ Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
The entry threshold in year t is computed using an ordered probit analysis since the threshold only takes integer values (starting at 0). The entry threshold is assumed to depend upon six exogenous variables. These are personal income per capita (PersInc), rate of The effect of personal income is significant for eight industries. Five times a significant positive effect is found: for plumbing, pharmacies, clothing, restaurants and real estate. The City dummy is eight times significant and only for plumbing there is a positive effect.
Hence, in general shops in small municipalities suffer from the presence of larger cities nearby. The Border dummy is only significant for four industries and all of these effects are negative.
[ Table 2 about here]
Entry and exit adjusting for disequilibrium
For each of the industries in Table 2 we computed the predicted number of firms in a municipality, . This is used to compute the market 'disequilibrium': the difference between the predicted and actual number of firms, . A positive difference indicates 'market room' for new entry, while a negative difference indicates lack of 'market room'.
Entrepreneurs who are alert to profit opportunities are more likely to enter local markets with considerable 'market room' when compared to more saturated markets. Entrepreneurs in crowded local markets (who make losses) are more likely to leave than entrepreneurs in unsaturated markets, maybe to enter other more promising local markets. Hence, we expect that local markets in which the predicted number of firms exceeds the actual number to show higher entry rates, lower exit rates and, consequently, higher net entry rates than local markets in which the actual number exceeds the predicted number. The results suggest that net entry indeed adjusts for disequilibrium. For four industries (Painting, Pharmacies, Flowers, Caterers) this adjustment is more than 10% for a three-year period. However, for other industries this adjustment can be more modest. The results also indicate that the adjustment for disequilibrium mainly takes places through differences in entry rates between municipalities.5 This suggests that when the actual number of firms is higher than the available 'market room', a negative net entry rate is caused by a lower entry rate rather than by a higher exit rate.
Conclusion
We derive a relationship between local market size and number of firms for thirteen different Belgian retail and service industries (in 1998) using ordered probit analysis. We investigate whether markets that have higher (lower) actual than predicted numbers of firms show exit (entry) in subsequent periods of one and three years. The results confirm that over a threeyear period the rate of (net) entry is positively affected by the presence of market 'room'. The exit rate, however, does not show a negative relation with market 'room'. This indicates that changes in entry rates are a more likely source of adjusting for market disequilibria than changes in exit rates. The speed of adjustment is relatively low for most industries, however. (9) Note: The maximum number of firms across municipalities per category is given between brackets. The minimum number is always zero. 
